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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, SfTATE OF UTAH

VARIAN - EIMAC, INC., and/or
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE,

COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioners/Appellants,
Case No. 870344-CA
v.
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

Category 6

Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HELEN D. LAMOREAUX
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Cqurt pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-83 (1987 Supp.).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The Respondent submits that the issue of timely filing
is governed by the following statutes and rules:
UCA Section 35-1-33 [1953]
A substantial compliance with the requirements of this
title shall be sufficient to give effeat to the orders of the
commission, and they shall not be declared inopperative, illegal
on word for any ommission of a technical nature.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 [1953]
All orders of the commission within its jurisdiction
shall be presumed reasonable and lawful! until they are found

otherwise in an action brought for that purpose, or unt-il altered
or revoked by the commission.
Respondent's timely filing is also governed by 35-182.55 which provides:
Every motion tor review shall be in
writing, and shall specify in detail the
particular errors and objections. Such
motions must be filed within fifteen days
of the date of any order of the administrative law judge or commission unless further
time is granted by the administrative law
judge or commission within fifteen days,
and unless so filed, said order shall
bescome the award of the commission and
shall be final.
The question of legal causation is governed by U.C.A.
Section 35-1-45 [Supp. 1987] and the cases of this state's courts
interpreting that statute, in particular Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986).
Section 35-1-45 (Supp. 1987) provides:
Every employee mentioned in Section
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependants
of every such employee who is killed, by
accident arising out of or in the court of
his employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation
for loss sustained on account of the injury
or death, and such amount for medical,
nurse and hospital services and medicines,
and, in case of death, such amount of
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation
and payment of medical, nursing and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall
be on the employer and its insurance
carrier and not on the employee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 24, 1986, Helen D. Lamoreaux filed an application for Hearing with the Utah State Industrial Commission. Mrs.
Lamoreaux, the Respondent, sought compensation for an injury sustained in the course of her employment with Petitioner Varian Eimac, Inc., on November 15, 1985.

Petitioners filed an answer

denying that the injury to Mrs. Lamoreaux was compensable.

On

November 17, 1986, a hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge Gilbert A. Martinez, following which Mrs. Lamoreaux was
referred to a medical panel.

Judge Martinez subsequently issued

his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in which he
found a medical causal relationship between Mrs. Lamoreaux's
injuries and her employment with Petitioner.

However, Judge

Martinez "reluctantly" denied compensation, based on his
understanding of Allen v. Industrial Cojmmission, 729 P. 2d 15
(1986) (R. at 261). Respondent filed a Motion for Review of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law an a Order, pointing out: (1)
compensation should be awarded under Allen, Supra, and (2)
compensation should be awarded because Mrs. Lamoreaux's so-called
pre-existing injury also arose out of her employment with Petitioner.

The Industrial Commission issued an Order granting com-

pensation on the grounds that Respondent had not brought a
personal risk to the work place and therefore the policy demands
of Allen were met.

Petitioners appealep. this Order.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In February, 1980, Helen D. Lamoreaux began working

for Petitioner Varian - Eimac, Inc.
2.

Mrs. Lamoreaux at that time, had no back problems

or pain of any kind.
3.

(R. at 32.)

(R. at 27, 18, 246.)

Mrs. Lamoreaux had injured her back 28 years

previously? however, this injury was to her middle back area, not
the lower back, and had healed completely.
4.

(R. at 26, 256.)

Mrs. Lamoreaux's assignment, beginning in November,

1982, with Petitioner was preping and loading x-ray tubes, which
involved lifting weights up to 100 pounds up to 90 times a day, as
well as torquing to assemble the tubes.
5.
of 1985.

(R. at 33-37.)

Mrs. Lamoeaux continued in this job until September

(R. at 38.)
6.

As a result of this assignment, Mrs. Lamoreaux had

occasional back pain which caused her to seek chiropractic and
medical treatment.

She did not, however, miss a single day's

work due to this discomfort.
7.

(R. at 28, 29, 37, 38.)

This discomfort was not in the same place in Mrs.

Lamoreaux's back as the subsequent injury of November 15, 1985.
(R. at 38.)
8.

On November 15, 1985, Mrs. Lamoreaux's work

involved lifting, from the floor, turning and carrying, 18 1/2
pound objects 40 to 60 times a day (R. at 39, 271.)

9.

At this time, November 15J 1985, Mrs. Lamoreaux1 s

previous back problem was "completely quiescent'1 (R. at 246.)
10.

On November 15, 1985, Mrsl Lamoreaux was lifting a

Bl-90 center and turned to the right to| walk down the hall,
twisting her back.
11.

(R. at 39, 279.)

As she twisted her back, Mrs. Lamoreaux testified

that she felt a sharp pain in her lower back, which later
radiated to her left leg.
12.

(R. at 39, 249, 279.)

As a result, Mrs. Lamoreaux suffered a ruptured

invertabral disk which was caused by the lifting, turning and
carrying motion made while carrying the|Bl-90 centers.

(R. at

187, 194. 207, 256.)
13.

Medical testimony and reports show that lifting an

18 1/2 pound object and turning to the right can cause invertabral
disk herniation.
14.

(R. at 248, 249, 256.)

Mrs. Lamoreaux was temporarily totally disabled

from November 21, 1985 through June 23, 1986.
15.

(R. at 257.)

On December 17, 1985, a partial laminectomy of the

left L-5 Lamina with left L5-S1 disk excpision was performed.

(R.

at 122.)
16.

While this operation eliminated the radiating leg

pain, Mrs. Lamoreaux's lifestyle and physical abilities have been
severely limited as residuals of her disk herniation and
subsequent surgery.

(R. at 45-51, 220-225, 248.)

17.

Mrs. Lamoreaux, as a result of this injury, has a

15% whole* person permanent partial impairment. (R. at 249, 257.)
18.

Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrative Law Judge,

found that there was "a direct medically causal connection
between applicant's low back problems and the industrial incident
of November 14, 1985."
19.

(R. at 256.)

Administrative Law Judge Martinez further found

that "the incident at work in lifting an 18 1/2 pound object and
turning to the right can indeed cause an intervertebral disk
herniation."
20.

(R. at 256.)
However, Administrative Law Judge Martinez

"reluctantly" denied compensation, in spite of the medical causal
connection.
21.

(R. at 261.)
On review, the Industrial Commission, citing Allen

v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986) said:
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a pre-existing condition must show, that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition ... this extra exertion serves to offset the
pre-existing condition of the employee as a likely cause
of the injury, thereby eliminating claims from impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work. [Allen, at 25].
If the purpose of applying the higher causation
standard is to prevent the employer from being liable
for a risk not created by that employer, then it does
not serve that purpose to apply that higher standard to
cases where the contributing pre-existing condition is
one which developed due to work duties with the same
employer responsible for the most recent accident.

6

On this basis, the Commission awarded Mrs. Lamoreaux compensation
constant with the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge. (R.
at 285, 286.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Workers Compensation law, in U.C.A. Section 351-45 (Supp. 1987) requires that each claimant's injuries be a
result of an accident, which is causally related, legally and
medically, to the claimant's employment]
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986).

Allen v. Industrial
f the employee has a pre-

existing condition, the event causing tike injury must be unusual
exertion not common to normal daily livinq to meet the legal
causation prong of the test.
The present case involves an employee who entered the job
with no pre-existing condition.

Thereafter, the claimant had some

back problems with her back in the course of her employment.

The

employee, Helen D. Lamoreaux, then began a new assignment with the
same employer.

This job involved lifting, turning, and carrying

20 pound objects up to sixty times a day.

The cumulative result

of these exertions was the cause of an injury of the Respondent's
lower back.
The Industrial Commission properly awarded Mrs.
Lamoreaux compensation for her injuries!

Cumulative exertions

resulting in injuires have often been compensated by the Supreme
Court.

Further, the repetitiveness of these efforts is clearly-

unusual, as defined in Allen, and subsequent court decisions. As

the purpose of this high legal causation standard is to protect
employers Erom compensating employees who bring a personal risk
to the jobr the Petitioner is not entitled to its protection when
the risk was caused in the course of the same employment.

The

award of the Commission is correct in the application of the
standard and in the purpose of the legal causation test.
The Respondents Motion for Review was timely filed and
the Industrial Commission had authority to enter its Order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULING PROPERLY
APPLIES THE LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD IN ALLEN
AS WELL AS ITS UNDERLYING POLICY AND SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
A.

The aggravation of a pre-existing injury as a cumu-

lative result of repetative, unusual exertions meets the legal
causation test announced in Allen.
The Supreme Court/ in Allen v« Industrial Commission/
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)/ announced clearly the standard to be
used in evaluating industrial injuries for compensation.

Peti-

tioner agrees that the injuries suffered by the Respondent/ Helen
Lamoreaux/ were the result of an accident, as defined in Allen.
Petitioner also agrees that these injuries were a direct medical
result of the accident which Ms. Lamoreaux experienced while
working for the Petitioner.

Rather, Petitioner attacks the

ruling of Industrial Commission on the grounds that since Ms.
8

Lamoreaux was injured previously while

n their employ, they are

entitled to protection from liability b^ the higher legal
standard announced in Allen. However, ^ven when this standard is
applied, the injuries to Ms. Lamoreaux ar e compensable.
The Supreme Court has long re cognized that an injury
which is the cumulative result of repet itive exertions is compensable by Workmen's Compensation.

See M|era v. Industrial Commis-

sion, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corporation v.
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 1693 (Utah 1980); United States Steel Co. v.
Draper, 613 P.3d 508 (Utah 1980); (pre- Existing condition aggravated or added to in course of work); _
C^fling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 20

(1965).

Miera, Supra is significant in that it was decided after
Allen and applied the higher legal caus ition standard.

In that

case the employee periodically jumped orit o a shelf in a hole,
then to the bottom (two, four-foot jump ) at half hour intervals
(a total of eight times).' The onset of the pain was gradual. The
Court, applying Allen, said that these Exertions were "considerably greater exertion than that encount i r ed in non-employment life
and therefore are legally sufficient".

Miera, at 1024, 1025.

Further, in Allen itself, the Court said t h a t whether A l l e n ' s
exertion was unusual depended on "how m^iny c r a t e s were moved by
the Claimant, the distance the crates w0re moved, t h e p r e c i s e

9

weight of the crates, and the size of the area in which the
lifting and moving took place'1.

Allen, at 28.

In our case, Helen Lamoreaux was injured on November 15,
1985.

Her job at the time involved lifting Bl-90 x-ray tubes,

weighing about 20 pounds each, from the floor, turning and carrying the Bl-90, and setting it down.
40 to 60 times a day.

This was repeated every day,

Typical non-employment exertions include

carrying garbage cans and luggage, and lifting small children.
They do not include lifting, turning and carrying 20 pound
objects 40 to 60 times a day, any more than they include making
four foot jumps into a hole (Miera) or slipping an arm under a
person to raise them while straightening their shirt (Richfield
Care Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987) (applying
Allen higher legal causation standard).
This case is very similar to Kaiser Steel Corporation
v. Monfredi, Supra.

The applicant had been a miner for 27 years

and had a history of back problems.
existing problems while shoveling.

He aggravated these preThe Court, noting the "recog-

nized rule of construction [that] resolves any doubt respecting
the right of compensation in favor of the injured employee" and
the principle that "the compensation statutes should be liberally
construed in favor of recovery" affirmed the award of the Industrial Commission, supra, at 892, quoting McPhie v. Industrial
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).

10

In both Monfredi and the case at bar, the actual
exertion preceding the injury was not s trenuous in and of itself,
However, the Court looked at the cumul at ive exertion of shoveling. Likewise it was the repetative li fcting, turning and
carrying, which produced Helen Lamoreau pc's injuries. This
clearly meets the standard set by Allen
B.

The Industrial Commission s ruling granting com-

pensation satisfies the policy concerns of Allen by protecting
employer's from compensating injuries which pre-date employment
The Court, in Allen, Supra, stated the standard for
legal causation where there are pre-existing injuries, and also

c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d t h e purpose and polfLcy behind t h i s r u l e ; when
i t said:
To meet the legal causation requirement, a
claimant with a pre-existing condition must
show that the employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in every day life because of his
condition. . .This extra exertion serves to
offset the pre-existing condition of the
employee as a likely cause of the injury,
thereby eliminating claims from impairments
resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work. (Allen at 25).
The Court further cited Professor Larson as saying that
"if there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there
is no prior weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the
[injury] as a matter of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the
legal test of causation". Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Section 38.83(b), at 7-278 (1986).
11

The purpose, then, is to protect employers from claims
based on injuries which, while they occur on the job, are not
related to the work being done by the employee.

Helen Lamoreaux,

however, had no back pain or injury when she began to work for
Petitioner in February, 1980. All the problems which she
experienced prior to November 15, 1985, arose out of her employment for Petitioner.

In the language of the Court, there was no

"personal risk" which Helen Lamoreaux brought with her in 1980.
Since there was no "personal causal contribution. . ., any exertion connected with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation", Allen, at 26.
Important to note is that the Medical Panel found no pre-existing
injury and Helen Lamoreaux began employment for Petitioner in
1980.

(Record P. 246, Medical Panel Report.)
In granting Helen Lamoreaux compensation for her

injuries the Industrial Commission made Findings of Fact which
carefully took into account the medical reports and the personal
history of the Claimant and made a decision based on credible
evidence.

It was not "arbitrary or capricious".

Residential and

Commercial Construction Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d
427 (Utah, 1974).

The Commission applied Allen according to its

clearly articulated purpose.

In doing so, it rejected claims by

the Petitioner that it be shielded from liability because Mrs.
Lamoreaux had been previously injured while in its employ.

12

Nor does the Industrial Commission's award generate
confusion as Petitioner fears.

Medical boards routinely appor-

tion causation between the accident and several pre-existing
conditions.

For example, in Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson

Supra, the Court made an award apportioned between three
injuries.

(2.5% to pre-existing conditions; 2.5% to a 1980

injury; 2.5% to the accident.)

Significantly, this case was

decided using the Allen test and involved a pre-existing condition as well as a second injury from th^ same employment.

The

Court stated that slipping an arm under a patient to raise him
and reaching around to straighten his slfiirt met the legal causation standard.
However, the case at bar diffeirs from Torgerson in as
much as Helen Lamoreaux had no condition pre-existing her employment with Petitioner.

(See Record P. 2f6, Record of Medical

Panel.)
The Petitioner's argument would allow an employer whose
work caused 100% of the injured worker's injury to escape
liability when the injured worker brought no personal risk (no
pre-existing injury) at the time of employment.

Such and

argument does not meet the policy of the Workers Compensation Act
as it existed by Court decisions prior to Allen and would violate
the policy and formula set out in Allen 1
Commission's award should be affirmed.

13

Thus, the Industrial

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION
TO ENTER ITS ORDER BASED UPON RESPONDANT'S
MOTION FOR REVIEW.
A.

Respondent's Motion for Review was Timely Filed.

Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-82.53 provides for the
review of an Order from an Administrative Law Judge or the
Commission.

It provides:

(1) Any party in interest who is
dissatisfied with the order entered by an
administrative law judge or the commission
may file a motion for review of such order.
Upon the filing of such motion to review
his order the administrative law judge may
(a) reopen the case and enter a supplemental order after holding such further
hearing and receiving such further evidence
as he may deem necessary; or (b) amend or
modify his prior order by a supplemental
order; or (c) refer the entire case to the
commission. If the administrative law
judge makes a supplemental order, as provided above, it shall be final unless a
motion to review the same shall be filed
with the commission.
The time within which a Motion for Review must be filed
is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-55, Rule 490-1-5,
Workers Compensation Rules and Regulations and Rule 6(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 35-1-82.55 provides:
Every motion for review shall be in
writing, and shall specify in detail the
particular errors and objections. Such
motions must be filed within fifteen days
of the date of any order of the administrative law judge or commission unless further
time is granted by the administrative law
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judge or commission within fifteen days,
and unless so filed, said order shall
become the award of the commission and
shall be final.

Rule 490-1-5 provides:
Whenever a notice or othef paper
requiring or permitting some action on
behalf of a party is served on a party by
mail, three (3) days shall be added to the
prescribed period contained in this Rules
or in the Workers' Compensation Act.
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
applies since February 16, 1987, was President's Day, a State
Holiday, reads:
In computing any period oi time prescribed or allowed by these rul es, by the
local rules of any district court, by order
of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from
which the designated period of time begins
to run shall not be included. The last day
of the period so computed shall] be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday^ (emphasis added)
It is clear that the Petitioner's argument did not
accurately calculate the due date, because February 16, 1987 was
a National and State holiday.

Moreover, the office of the Indus-

trial Commission was closed, thus, no filings could be made that
day.

(See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, legal coun-

sel, Industrial Commission).
An accurate calculation of the |due date would be made by
counting as follows:
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January 29, 1987

(not i n c l u d e d , s e e Rule 6 ( a ) )

January 30, 1987

1st day

January 31, 1987

2nd day

February 1, 1987

3rd day

February 2, 1987

4th day

February 3, 1987

5th day

February 4, 1987

6th day

February 5, 1987

7th day

February 6, 1987

8th day

February 7, 1987

9th day

February 8, 1987

10th day

February 9, 1987

11th day

February 10, 1987

12th day

February 11, 1987

13th day

February 12, 1987

14th day

February 13, 1987

15th day

February 14, 1987

1st day additional for mailing
Rule 490-1-5

February 15, 1987

2nd day additional for mailing
Rule 490-1-5

February 16, 1987

3rd day additional for mailing
Rule 490-1-5
Date filing due if not a Holiday

February 17, 1987

Date Due

That to the knowledge of counsel for Respondent, the
Motion for Review was in fact, delivered to the Industrial
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Commission on February 17, 1987, the date due, by his staff.

(See

Addendum 2, Affidavit of C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.)
Counsel for Respondent was in Provo and was not sure he
could file the Motion for Review that day so Respondent requested
an extension of time for filing the Motion for Review earlier on
February 17, 1987, from Judge Martinez, in case it became necessary.

Upon his return from Provo, counsel for Respondent was

able to prepare the Motion For Review and it was hand-delivered
timely on February 17, 1987.

The Industrial Commission has the

power under Section 35-1-82.55 Utah Code Annotated, to grant an
extension and the decision of the Commission dated July 13, 1987 is
evidence of such extension.

The timeliness of the filing of the

Motion for Review would not have been questioned in any event
because as a general practice the Commission does not address
timeliness of filing when an item is a day or two late.

(See

Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, LJegal Counsel, Industrial
Commission) .
B.

Assuming arguendo the Respondents Motion for Review

was actually not received and stamped until February 19, 1987, the
Industrial Commission still had jurisdiction to enter its Order.
1.

The Workers Compensation Act is to be liberally

construed in favor of granting compensate ion and substantial compliance with its requirements is suffici ent (
The purpose of the Workers Comjjensation system is
remedial.

As such, both the legislatur
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and the Supreme Court

have determined that its provisions are to be liberally construed
in favor of granting compensation.
sion, 567 P.2d 153, 155.

McPhie v. Industrial Commis-

We are also reminded that the Workers

Compensation statute, like other statutes, should be liberally
construed to effect the purpose of the statute and justice.

See

Chandler v„ Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 43, 21, 184 P.2d 1020,
1021 (1919) and Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362
(Utah, 1980).
Section 68-3-2 Utah Code Annotated provides:
The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to
the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under
them are to be liberally construed with a
view to effect the objects of the statutes
and to promote justice. Whenever there is
any variance between the rules of equity
and the rules of common law in reference to
the same matter the rules of equity shall
prevail. (emphasis added)
The Utah State Legislature has specifically mandated that
the Commission and the Courts avoid over-technical applications of
procedure which might deny fair compensation to injured claimants.
Section 35-1-33 reads:
A substantial compliance with the requirements of this title shall be considered
sufficient to give effect to the orders of
the Commission, and they shall not be considered inoperative,, illegal, or void for
any omission of a technical nature,
(emphasis added)
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The Court in Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, P.2d 138, stated that "proceedings before the
Industrial Commission need not be as technical as are those in the
Courts".

Jxi., at P. 141. (Citing Sectiork 35-1-33, the Court

allowed the Commission to consider and tj>ase its findings on hearsay evidence).
Additionally, there appears to[be a very apparent problem
in the timely stamping and filing of documents at the Industrial
Commission, which has caused the Industrial Commission to overlook
filings a day or two late.

(See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara

Elcerio, Legal Counsel, Industrial Commitssion).
An example of this filing probl<em is on page 242 of the
record.

A letter written by counsel for Appellant dated December

4, 1986, was received and stamped at counsel for Respondents'
office on December 5, 1987 (See Addendunj 3) but not stamped as
being filed at the Industrial Commission until December 8, 1987,
three days later. (R. at 242). Also the Medical Panel Report dated
December 11, 1987, (R. at 246) is not stamped as being filed by the
Commission until December 17, 1987.

A l|etter from Counsel for

Respondent dated and mailed January 16, 1987 is not stamped as
being filed until January 20, 1987.

(R. at 252.)

This problem is not limited to mailed documents.

For

example, Respondent's Motion for Review was hand-delivered to the
Industrial Commission on February 17, 1987 and not stamped as filed
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until February 19, 1987.

(R. at 271.)

Another example of a hand-

delivery problem was Petitioners Petition for Writ of Review (R. at
290-292) which was hand-delivered to the office of counsel for
Respondent August 12, 1987 (See Addendum 4) and the Court of
Appeals on August 12, 1987 and hand-delivered to Industrial Commission August 12, 1987, (R. at 292). However, it was not stamped
as being filed at the Commission until December 13, 1987 (R. at
290) 1
In this light and pursuant to authority granted to the
Industrial Commission, it is little wonder why the Industrial
Commission does not and should not reject documents, motions, etc.,
for being untimely stamped as filed if only one or two days late.
(See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, legal counsel, Industrial Commission).
Also, in this light, where the timing of a particular
Motion may be crucial, we are left to ponder what date should the
Commission and the Court use as a basis for decision: 1) the date
of hand-delivery by counsel or 2) date of stamping and filing which
may be one,

two, three or more days later.

Obvious injustice would

occur if the fact that a date stamp done tardy were used to reject
a document timely delivered by counsel.
Cases cited by the Petitioner are not compelling under
our facts, nor are they controling, Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah.2d
36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Sup-
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ply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984); and ktate v. Johnson, 700 P.2d
1125 (Utah 1985).

In Watson, Supra, th^ Court dismissed the

Appellants Appeal because it was filed 4 1/2 months beyond the 30
day appeal period.

In State v. Johnson] Supra, the Court dis-

missed a criminal defendant's appeal because of the failure to
timely pay the filing fee.

In Prowswood, Supra, the Court also

dismissed an appeal for the failure of Appellant to pay the
required filing fee.
In Lantham v. Industrial Commist sion, 717 P.2d 255 (Utah,
1986) the Court referred to Section 35-1-82.55 and recites the
statute without explanation.

In Lantham, Supra, the Court was

faced with the issue as to when a Motion for Review should be
filed for an interlocutory or temporary order.

The Court held

that although the Motion for Review was filed 43 days after the
interlocutory order, since the Motion fdr Review was filed within
15 days of the Final Order, it was timely.

The Court made a ruling

based in fairness and equity of facts existing in that case.
In Retherford v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah Adv.
Rep.61 (Utah Court App. 1987) the Court dealt solely with issue of
whether or not a Petition for Writ of Rejview was filed in a timely
manner with the Court of Appeals as requlired in Section 35-1-83
Utah Code Annotated.
It is clear then, that the Respondent's filing of its
Motion for Review February 17, 1987 was timely and that the late

21

date stamp which was later than the actual hand-delivery by the
Industrial Commission should not be used to deny recovery.
2.

Because of the purposes of the Workers Compen-

sation, Act even in the absence of timely filing where delay is not
excessive or fair, the Industrial Commission has, under the proper
circumstances and in interest of justice, have authority to waive
timeliness of filing .
In a civil case, where because of excusable neglect a
default judgment or other order is entered, under proper circumstances under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the
judgment or order may be set aside.

Rule 60(b) provides in perti-

nent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect... or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, (Utah, 1953),
the Court stated:
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to
relieve against harshness of enforcing a
judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortune to which
prevent the presentation of a claim or
defense. (260 P.2d 742.)
The Court also stated:
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Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the court will
incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have
a hearing. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276
P.908. However, the movant must show that
he has shown due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances
of which he had no control. Peterson
v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P.£860. (260
P.2d at 743)
The Court, in Katz v. Pierce, ^32 P.2d 92, 41 Utah
Adv. Rep. 12, (9/10/86), held that:
The District Court judges lare vested
with considerable discretion under this
rule in granting or denying a Motion to Set
Aside a Judgment. The Court should be
generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside whether it is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to answer and when timely application is made...Where there is doubt about
whether a default should be set aside, that
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing
so. (41 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. See Also
Russell v. Mar tell, 681 P. 2d 11J93 (Utah,
1981)
The same reasoning and purpose lof Rule 60(b) has been
applied in Workers Compensation cases.
In Fink v. Industrial Commission, 689 P.2d 708 (Colorado,
1984) the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that although a
Petition for Review was filed four days after the deadline, a
mistake by an employee of the Appeals Se ption of the Commission
upon which counsel for Petitioner relied upon, warranted waiver of
timeliness.
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In Cook v. Industrial Commission, 651 P.2d 365 (Arizona,
1982) in a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona the
issue involved the filing five days late of a Request for Review.
The Court held that the attorney's substitute secretary's
inaccurate notation, which resulted in late filing, warranted
waiver of timely filing requirement where delay not excessive nor
prejudical.

See also Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 576 P.2d

134 (Crt. of App. Arizona, 1977) late filing of one day waived for
good cause-miscalculation; Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 493 P.2d 913
(Arizona, 1972) late filing of 10 days waived for good cause, late
doctor report and ambiguous notice).
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the Industrial
Commission's authority to waive the timeliness requirement of a
Motion for Review in an Employment Security case.

Section 35-4-

1(a) provides that a review of a decision involving contribution
liability shall be filed within ten days of the decision.

Section

35-4-10(b) provides that an appeal to an appeal referee shall be
made within ten days.
In Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 641 P.2d
156 (Utah, 1982) held that the unemployment compensation recipient
had not timely filed his appeal to the appeal referee within ten
days and thus the appeal referee had no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
In Thiessens v. Department of Employment Security, 663
P.2d 72 (Utah, 1983), the court held that an untimely appeal to
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the appeals section by an unemployment Compensation claimant could
be heard, if under the Industrial Commission's rule the claimant
could show good cause for the delay in filing.

The court clearly

recognizes the power of the Industrial Commission to allow a late
filing of an administrative appeal if the claimant could show good
cause.
This recognized ability of the Industrial Commission is
also supported by the decisions on the cases of Wood v. Department of Employment Security, 680 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1984), Kirkwood
v. Department of Employment Security, 709 P.2d 1158 (Utah, 1985)
and Mini Spas Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 13
(Feb. 3, 1987).
The Industrial Commission in Wcbrkers Compensation has
also adopted a policy to allow the consideration of untimely
filings of Motions for Review.

(See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara

Alcerio, legal counsel, Industrial Commission).
The Court, in order to fulfill the mandate of Section 351-33 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) should allow the
Industrial Commission to waive non-excessive, non-prejudicial late
filings for good cause shown.

If the purposes of the liberality

of Workers Compensation are to be fulfilled, certainly claimants
here should be allowed at least the samq equity and equal protection of the laws as civil litigants due under Rule 60(b), and
employment security cases under Industrieal Commission Employment
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Security rule 475-6c-8. The Court should adopt this equitable
principle and allow the Industrial Commission latitude to consider
Motions for Review on their merits and not remove from consideration of Industrial Commission by technical rules or mistakes.
Particularly, in this case, where the untimeliness if any was
caused by the Industrial Commission's own recognized dating and
filing problems.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently and consistently
held that repetitive exertions which cumulate in injury are compensable under the Workers Compensation Act.

In Allen, and since,

the Court has looked at repetitiveness as a factor making an
exertion unusual for the purpose of the higher legal causation
test.

Mrs. Lamoreaux's injuries resulted from this type of cumu-

lative exertion.
The purpose of the higher legal causation standard, where
the claimant has a pre-existing injury, is to protect employers
from having to pay for injuries which the employee brought with
him.

It protects the employer where the work he provides is not

the causal agent.

The higher standard does not serve that purpose

in the present case, because the injury did not pre-exist Mrs.
Lamoreaux's employment with Petitioner, but was in fact caused by
it.
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Finally, given the remedial purpose ot the Act, ana tne
fact that Mrs. Lamoreaux has suffered a compensable injury, the
dating and filing problem of the Industrial Commission, and the
power of the Industrial Commission, the court should hold the
Respondents' Motion for Review was filed timely, or that an
extension for filing or that the Commission has the recognized
power to waive timeliness of the Motion.
The Industrial Commission's Ordeer g r a n t i n g Motion for
Review and awarding compensation to Respondent should be affirmed,
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1988.
Respectfully Submitted,

f

tjLc<*7

C. "Richard /Hgftirikse:
A t t o r n e y Tor Resp,
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were HAND-DEL IVERED on this 3rd day of
March, 1988, to the following counsel of record:
MICHAEL E. DYER
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Petitioners
Varian - Eimac, Inc. and/or
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
ERIE V. BOORMAN, Administrator
SECOND INJURY FUND
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5800
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84110-5800

i€£l&t£^
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DIVISION
Norman H Bangerter
Governor
Frances T Moffat
Director

160 East 300 South
PO Box 510250
Salt Lake City Utah 84151 -0250
Toll Free 1 -800-426-0667

Stephen M Hadley
Chairman
L L Nielsen
Commissioner
John Florez
Commissioner

February 26, 19$8

Roger Henriksen
Attorney
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Mr. Henriksen:
This letter is in response to your inquiry regarding general Industrial
Commission procedure. The Industrial Commission is a state agency recognizing
all state holidays including President's Day. Therefore, The Industrial Commission
was closed for business on February 16, 1987.
All Industrial Commission mail is received at t e Heber Wells Building at a
central distribution mail room where it is hand-sort d and then delivered to the
third floor. Industrial Commission mail is deliverer to Administration where it
is again hand-sorted according to which division of he Industrial Commission is
indicated on the envelope. When the Industrial Accident Division gets its mail
from Administration, the mail is placed in a basket to be stamped in. The foregoing process may take several days to complete. Although the stamp at the
upper right hand corner states ,frecievedff on a certain date, that date is not
necessarily the date the mail got to the Heber Wells Building or even the Industrial Commission. That stamped date is at best an approximation of the date of
receipt. Realizing the stamped date may vary several days from actual receipt
of the item at issue, the Commission maintains the general practice of not
addressing timeliness of filing where an item is mailed and only one or two days
are at issue. I hope this adequately answers your question regarding Industrial
Commission procedure.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

-4.
Barbara Elicerio
Legal Counsel

i~~£s<~

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DIVISION
u™,™ u D „ •
Norman H Bangerter
G.^rnor
Frances T Moffat
Director

,__ _
_ _ _ _ ,_
160 East 300 South
., ^ n _.. c , , ^ r t
° 0 Box 510250
Salt Lake C.ty Utah 84151-0250
Toll Free 1 -800-426-0667

February

26,

1988

Stephen M Hadlev
Chairman
L L Nielsen
Commtsj.finf r
John Florez
Commissioner

Timothy Shea
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Mr. Shea:
This letter will act as notice to you and the Court that there has been yet
another change in the manner in which Industrial Commission workers compensation
appeals will be handled* It is unfortunate that the representation of the Industrial Commission on appeal has been in a state of transition ever since the Court
first began hearing cases. Hopefully, this is the last time I will need to communicate with you on this particular topic.
On February 17, 1988, I confirmed with Earl Dorius, Assistant Attorney General
and Division Chief for the Governmental Affairs Division, that the Attorney GeneralTs
office would agree to provide representation for the Industrial Commission Industrial Accident Division (formerly the Workers Compensation Division) on appeals to
the Court of Appeals. The Attorney General's office has decided to proceed in the
same manner as it did formerly on workers compensation appeals to the Supreme Court.
In other words, the Attorney General will provide representation for the Industrial
Commission in cases where the party aligned with the Industrial Commission is not
represented by counsel. In cases where the respondent or respondents aligned with
the Industrial Commission is/are represented by counsel, the Attorney General will
not make an appearance on behalf of the Industrial Commission. I will continue
to monitor all cases on appeal to the Court of Appeals. I will be writing Mark
Wainwright, Assistant Attorney General, in each case appealed informing him whether he will need to to appear on behalf of the Industrial Commission and I will
copy the Court with those letters.
Specifically, this new understanding will effect only one case currently on
appeal. That case is :
Varian-Eimac, Inc. and/or Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance v. Helen D. Lamoreaux, the Second Injury
Fund and the Industrial Commission of Utah, Case No.
870344-CA
The Industrial Commission originally indicated it would be making a separate
appearance in this matter. The Respondent briefs are due March 3, 1988. I have
discussed the matter with Roger Henriksen, counsel for Helen D. Lamoreaux, the
party aligned with the Industrial Commission on appeal. Mr. Henriksenrs arguments
on appeal are identical to the arguments the Industrial Commission had intended
on making and so Mr. Henriksen and I have agreed there is no need for the Industrial Commission to file a separate brief. By a copy of this letter, I am notifying the other parties to this appeal of the Industrial Commission's decision
in this respect.
Once again, I apologize for the confusion that has been cause by the changes.
I encourage you and your staff to call me with any questions of concerns you may
have with respect to this final change.
BY DIRECTION:
. W* i TT •
• u*. T,
u
.i
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
cc: Mark Wainwright, Roger Henriksen,
Michael Dyer, Erie Boorman, Stephan-f o Mai 1 nrv
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,

VARIAN - EIMAC, INC., and/or
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE,

ST|ATE

OF UTAH

COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioners/Appellants,
Case No. 870344-CA
v.
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

Category 6

Respondents.
AFFIDAVIT OF C. RICHARD HENJRIKSEN, J R .
The H o n o r a b l e G i l b e r t A. [ M a r t i n e z
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law j j i d g e
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
COMES NOW C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., after first being
sworn, deposes and swears as follows:
1.

That I am a duly licensed Attorney in the State of

Utah and attorney for Respondant.
2.

That on February 17, 1987, II was in Provo, Utah

working on a case and realized I may havd difficulty in filing
the Motion for Review in this case on that date.

3.

That I called the Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez,

Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission and left a
message at his office that I may need an additional few days to
file the Motion for Review and if that was not permissable,
please call my secretary, Judy Banks Garrett.
4.

That upon my return to the office from Provo, we

had not heard back from Judge Martinez, so to be sure we were
timely, I prepared and my secretary typed the Motion for Review.
5.

That we mailed the Motion for Review to those

persons shown on the Mailing Certificate and had either Judy
Banks Garrett, Paul B. Ellis or Stephen Buhler deliver the Motion
for Review to the Industrial Commission for filing.
6.

That because of the shortness of time, the typo-

graphical error on Page 3 Commission of the date line and signature line) I corrected by hand those lines as our messenger went
out the door.
7.

That I have spoken to the Industrial Commission to

see if they have a record of my telephone message to Judge
Martinez on February 17, 1987 and they do not have such a record;
however, Judge Martinez told me he receives such calls a dozen
times per day and not all messages are saved.
8.

That to my best knowledge and belief the Motion for

Review was filed with the Industrial Commission on February 17,
1987, the due date.

2

9.

Further, Affiant sayeth n^t.

DATED this 2nd day of March, 1^88

l\AuU. f^JofJ^C. RT*
chard

ksen,/^. 'Af f iant

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before |me this 2nd day of March,
1988.

LM

y uyv v /

&ciJ,v MOLhrft

NOTARY PUBLIC,
Residing a t S a l t Lake Co., Utah
My Commission E x p i r e s :

-U
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
A P R O F E S S I O N A L LAW C O R P O R A T I O N
CSB T O W E R - S O SOUTH MAIN —SUITE
P O BOX

?00

2465

S A L T L A K E CITY U T A H 8«HO
WILLIAM S/RICHARDS P C
ROBERT W BRANDT
P KEITH NELSON
M KENTCHRISTOPHERSON
GARY O/STOTT
GARY e( FERGUSON
ROBERT L STEVENS
NELSON L HAYES
DAVI© L BARCLAY
J O H N L YOUNG
OAV/O K LAURIT2EN

LYNN S DAVIES
ROBERT G GILCHRIST
MICHAEL E DYER
RUSSELL C FERICKS
MICHAEL K MOHRMAN
MICHAEL P ZACCHEO
GARY L J O H N S O N
STEPHANIE A MALLORY
RlCHARO L KING
MICHAEL L SCHWAB

DEC 0 5 198$

ROBERT W MILLER
094O-I983)
TELEPHONE
(SOD 531-1777

December 4, 1986

Judge Gilbert A. Martinez
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Bos^.5580
Salt Like City, Utah 84145-0580
Re:

Helen D. Lamoreaux v. Varjian-EIMAC, Inc.
Our File No.:
25766-190
Claim No.:
D57-14511
Date of Injury: 11/15/85

Dear Judge Martinez:
Please accept this letter as a supplemental
memorandum in the above matter based upo the recent landmark
decision
of Allen v. Industrial Commissi m, filed November
7
4, 1986, No. 20026. In general terms, illen stands for the
proposition that, if a worker has a pree: listing condition, the
worker must prove unusual or extraordina:fy exertion in order to
meet legal causation. If the worker doei not have a
preexisting condition, usual or ordinary sxertion is sufficient.
In the case of Helen Lamoreaux,! the applicant herein,
the evidence is clear that Mrs. Lamoreaux was suffering from a
preexisting condition. As fairly noted in the Summary of
Testimony, Mrs. Lamoreaux injured her back in an automobile
accident as early as 1958. While Mrs. Lamoreaux claimed not to
have had back problems immediately following the automobile
accident, she did have low-back pain later on in life prior to
the alleged industrial incident of November 15, 1985.
Significantly, Dr. Bauman recorded her history as follows:
She has a previous history of bkck
problems which dates back over a"couple of
years. She had had mild aching back at
the end of the day. She had never missed
any work or had any leg pain associated
with the back pain which she had had. Her
job involves lifting 10- and 184pound

Judge Gilbert A. Martinez
December 4, 1986
Page 2

objects all day long. For some reason when
she lifted this one time off the shelf she
felt a sudden pain in her back which went
down into her left leg. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The applicant's low-back pain was sufficiently severe
that she sought medical treatment on several occasions prior to
her alleged injury on November 15, 1986. For example, Dr.
Wayne Zundel noted in his clinical data the following diagnosis
of the applicant on April 22, 1985:
Arthritis — was much improved until she
lifted tubes at work and irritated back.
Next morning bent over to pick up a child
and had sudden onset of severe,
non-radiating low-back pain. Better today,
but still disabling.
(Exhibit D-l at 45.)
Clearly, the applicant was suffering from preexisting
arthritis in the spine which, on occasion, became disabling due
to pain. Because of the preexisting nature of the applicant's
injuries, the higher standard elucidated in the Allen
decision must be applied.
The question then becomes whether or not the lifting
of an object weighing 18 1/2 pounds is, on an objective basis,
an unusual or extraordinary effort. The answer to that
question is clearly ,fncff based upon the direct analysis of rhe
Utah Supreme Court in the Allen decision. In footnote 8 of
Allen, the Supreme Court defined in part the "usual wear and
tear of life — which certainly includes lifting objects
weighing 20 pounds, such as bags of golf clubs, minnow pails,
and stepladders." (Allen, footnote 8 at 16.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is undisputed in the present case that the
applicant was lifting only 18 1/2 pounds at the time of her
alleged incident. Directly applying the Supreme Court's
analysis of Allen to this case, it cannot be reasonably
stated that Mrs. Lamoreaux was engaged in activities of an
unusual or extraordinary nature. Therefore, based upon the

Judge Gilbert A. Martinez
December 4, 1986
Page 3

analysis in Allen, the defendants respectfully submit that
the applicant has failed in her burden 4s to legal causation,
and her claim must be denied.
Thank you for your consideration of this matter.
Very trully yours,
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELE

Michael
MED8/al
y
cc: C. Richard Henriksen^
Erie V. Boorman
Wausau Insurance Companies
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MICHAEL E. DYER
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Petitioners
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—

oooOooo —L-

VARIAN - EIMAC, INC. AND/OR
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW

Petitioners,
Case No. 86000755

vs.
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND
INJURY FUND, AND THE UTAH STATE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

COURT OF APPEALS #

-CA

Category #6
Respondents.
— - oooOooo — +
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-83 (1986), and
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, petitioners
Varian - Eimac, Inc. and/or Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance, by and through their counsel of record, petition the
Court for review of the Order of the Industrial Commission dated
July 13, 1987 granting defendant Lamoreaux's Motion for Review.
Petitioners seek review of the <prder aforementioned on
the following grounds:

1.

The Commission had no jurisdiction to enter its

order of July 13, 1987, as respondent Lamoreaux's Motion for
Review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of
the Administrative Law Judge was not timely filed pursuant to the
requirements of U.C.A. §35-1-82.55 and the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge thus constituted a
final Order from which no relief could be granted.
2.

The industrial incident of November 15, 1985 does

not constitute a compensable industrial accident for purposes of
Utah Worker's Compensation Law inasmuch as the applicant was
suffering from a preexisting condition at the time of her injury
and she failed to establish the requisite legal causation
necessary to render the incident compensable where a preexisting
condition is involved as per the standards set forth in Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
3.

If respondent Lamoreaux suffered a compensable

industrial accident on November 15, 1985, the Second Injury Fund
is liable for a percentage of the benefits owed to her under
U.C.A. §35-1-69 inasmuch as Ms. Lamoreaux was clearly suffering
from a preexisting condition at the time her injury occurred.
4.

A copy of the Order of the Industrial Commission

from which petitioners seek review is attached hereto as Exhibit
A.
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DATED this

JhL day of

1987.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

<6A

4&rL<*fs.

E. Dyer
A. Mallory
tys for Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true ana correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on the j^faf
vs^^^r

day of

, 1987, to the following counsel of record:
Utah State Industrial Commission
P.O. 5800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.
HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.|C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Erie V. Boorman
Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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